Perks and labor investment efficiency : evidence from China
Year of publication: |
2024
|
---|---|
Authors: | Hu, Juncheng ; Li, Xiaorong |
Subject: | Perk | Agency problem | Labor investment efficiency | China | Investition | Investment | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Effizienz | Efficiency | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Personalbeschaffung | Recruitment | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information |
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