Persuading the principal to wait
Year of publication: |
[2018] ; Current Version: 11th January, 2018
|
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Authors: | Orlov, Dmitry ; Skrzypacz, Andrzej ; Zryumov, Pavel |
Publisher: |
[Stanford, CA] : [Stanford Graduate School of Business] |
Subject: | strategic communication | bayesian persuasion | dynamic games | real options | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Kommunikation | Communication | Realoptionsansatz | Real options analysis | Dynamisches Spiel | Dynamic game | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Zeit | Time | Informationsverhalten | Information behaviour | Bayes-Statistik | Bayesian inference |
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