Persuasion with Multiple Actions

We consider a Bayesian persuasion model in which the receiver takes multiple actions. We compare a simultaneous procedure, in which the receiver takes all actions after the realization of a single signal, to a sequential procedure in which the receiver receives information gradually and takes the actions sequentially. We characterize conditions under which the sequential procedure leads to a higher payoff and when it achieves a maximal outcome despite potential information leakage. We also discuss the optimal ordering of actions

Year of publication:	[2021]
Authors:	Khantadze, Davit ; Kremer, Ilan ; Skrzypacz, Andrzej
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN

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