Persuasion with unknown beliefs
Year of publication: |
2022
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Authors: | Kosterina, Svetlana |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 17.2022, 3, p. 1075-1107
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Subject: | Bayesian persuasion | robust mechanism design | Bayes-Statistik | Bayesian inference | Kommunikation | Communication | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Robustes Verfahren | Robust statistics | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Gleichgewichtsmodell | Equilibrium model | Signalling | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information |
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