"Piggyback" lawsuits and deterrence : can frivolous litigation improve welfare?
Year of publication: |
2014
|
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Authors: | Miceli, Thomas J. ; Stone, Michael P. |
Published in: |
International review of law and economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0144-8188, ZDB-ID 704902-X. - Vol. 39.2014, p. 49-57
|
Subject: | Frivolous lawsuits | Care | Activity level | Deterrence | Theorie | Theory | Rechtsökonomik | Economic analysis of law | Zivilprozess | Civil litigation | Rechtsdurchsetzung | Law enforcement |
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