Platform pricing under dispersed information

Alessandro Pavan; Bruno Jullien

We study monopoly and duopoly pricing in a two-sided market with dispersed information about users' preferences. We first show how the dispersion of information introduces idiosyncratic uncertainty about participation rates and how the latter shapes the elasticity of the demands and thereby the equilibrium prices. We then study informative advertising campaigns and product design affecting the agents' ability to estimate their own valuations and/or the distribution of valuations on the other side of the market.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Pavan, Alessandro ; Jullien, Bruno
Publisher:	Evanston, Ill. : Center for the Study of Industrial Organization at Northwestern Univ.
Subject:	two-sided markets \| dispersed information \| platform competition \| global-games \| informative advertising \| Netzwerkökonomik \| Network economics \| Preismanagement \| Pricing strategy \| Theorie \| Theory \| Marktstruktur \| Market structure \| Werbung \| Advertising \| Digitale Plattform \| Digital platform \| Wettbewerb \| Competition \| Informationsökonomik \| Economics of information \| Unvollkommene Information \| Incomplete information \| Informationsverbreitung \| Information dissemination \| Preisdifferenzierung \| Price discrimination