Playing with the good guys. A public good game with endogenous group formation
Are some individuals generally more pro-social than others? If so, socially beneficial commitments could serve as a costly screening device helping the pro-social to match. We present a public good game experiment in which subjects choose between two group types: in blue groups, subjects receive a fixed extra payoff; in red groups, this extra payoff is donated, instead, to the Red Cross. A substantial share of our subjects chose red groups. Contributions in red groups were initially higher and stayed high, while contributions in blue groups displayed the well-known declining pattern.
Year of publication: |
2011
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Authors: | Brekke, Kjell Arne ; Hauge, Karen Evelyn ; Lind, Jo Thori ; Nyborg, Karine |
Published in: |
Journal of Public Economics. - Elsevier, ISSN 0047-2727. - Vol. 95.2011, 9-10, p. 1111-1118
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Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Subject: | Altruism Conditional cooperation Self-selection |
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