Policies for Green Design
We analyze alternative policies such as a disposal content fee, a subsidy for recyclable designs, unit pricing of household disposal, a deposit-refund system, and a manufacturer `take-back' requirement. In order to identify the problem being addressed, we build a simple general equilibrium model in which household utility depends on a negative externality from total waste generation, and in which firms use primary and recycled inputs to produce output that has two `attributes': packaging per unit output, and recyclability. If households pay the social cost of disposal, then they send the right signals to producers to reduce packaging and to design products that can more easily be recycled. But if local governments are constrained to collect household garbage for free, then households do not send the right signals to producers. The socially optimal attributes can still be achieved by a tax on producers' use of packaging and subsidy to producers' use of recyclable designs
Year of publication: |
[2022]
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Authors: | Fullerton, Don ; Wu, Wenbo |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Allgemeines Gleichgewicht | General equilibrium | Theorie | Theory | Öko-Produkt | Sustainable product | Umweltpolitik | Environmental policy | Kreislaufwirtschaft | Recycling | Produktgestaltung | Product design | Produktlebenszyklus | Product life cycle | Ökologische Verpackung | Green packaging |
Saved in:
freely available
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (24 p) |
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Series: | NBER Working Paper ; No. w5594 |
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments May 1996 erstellt |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013324059