Potential games are necessary to ensure pure nash equilibria in cost sharing games
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Gopalakrishnan, Ragavendran ; Marden, Jason R. ; Wierman, Adam |
Published in: |
Mathematics of operations research. - Catonsville, MD : INFORMS, ISSN 0364-765X, ZDB-ID 195683-8. - Vol. 39.2014, 4, p. 1252-1296
|
Subject: | cost sharing | game theory | marginal contribution | Nash equilibrium | Shapley value | Kooperatives Spiel | Cooperative game | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Shapley-Wert | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Kostenverrechnung | Cost allocation |
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