Power indices when players can commit to reject coalitions
Year of publication: |
2014
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kóczy, László Á. |
Publisher: |
Budapest : Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences |
Subject: | quarrelling | rejected coalitions | a priori voting power | power indices | minimal winning coalitions | rational players | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Koalition | Coalition | Macht | Power | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Abstimmungsspiel | Voting game |
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