Power indices when players can commit to reject coalitions
Year of publication: |
2016
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kóczy, László Á. |
Subject: | Quarrelling | Rejected coalitions | A priori voting power | Power indices | Minimal winning coalitions | Rational players | Koalition | Coalition | Macht | Power | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Abstimmungsspiel | Voting game | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Regierungskoalition | Coalition government | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Index | Index number |
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