Power or loss aversion? Reinterpreting the bargaining weights in search and matching models

We show that in a modified Mortensen–Pissarides model the bargaining weights depend on the players’ loss-aversion parameters. These weights can hence be calibrated without resorting to an assessment of players’ bargaining powers, which have proved difficult to empirically establish.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Ciccarone, Giuseppe ; Giuli, Francesco ; Marchetti, Enrico
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 118.2013, 2, p. 375-377
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Nash bargaining \| Search and matching \| Loss aversion

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty ; J64 - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010608072