Practically Implementable Auction for a Good with Countervailing Positive Externalities

This study theoretically presents a new auction design called "take-or-give auction." The auction solves the free-rider problem in the case of two symmetric and risk-neutral bidders competing for a good with countervailing positive externalities. The auction makes efficient allocation. Moreover, the extension of the auction by addition some rules maximizes the seller's expected revenue.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2012-11-29
Authors:	Bhirombhakdi, Kornpob ; Potipiti, Tanapong
Institutions:	Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Subject:	Auction design \| positive externalities \| countervailing

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	MPRA Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	C79 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. Other ; D44 - Auctions
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011110437