Precaution Incentives in Accident Settings

by Tim Friehe

Tim Friehe analyzes important aspects for the design of tort law which intends to induce optimal individual choices and possible limitations of workable tort law in varied settings. He highlights the consequences of the consideration of hitherto neglected behavioral dimensions for the conclusions of the economic analysis of tort law.

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Year of publication:	2008
Authors:	Friehe, Tim
Publisher:	Wiesbaden : Gabler Verlag / GWV Fachverlage GmbH, Wiesbaden
Subject:	Haftung \| Liability \| Rechtsökonomik \| Economic analysis of law \| Risikopräferenz \| Risk attitude \| Anreiz \| Incentives \| Theorie \| Theory \| Unerlaubte Handlung \| Schaden \| Prävention \| Ökonomische Theorie des Rechts
Description of contents:	Table of Contents [external.dandelon.com] ; Description [swbplus.bsz-bw.de]

Extent:	Online-Ressource (XIV, 189 p, online resource)
Series:	SpringerLink / Bücher
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Literaturangaben Preliminary; Introduction; The Economics of Tort Law:Basics and Selected Core Themes; On the Incentive Effects of Damage Averaging in Tort Law; On the Superiority of Damage Averaging in the Case of Strict Liability; Screening Accident Victims; A Note on Judgment Proofness and Risk Aversion; On the Similarity of Bilateral Harm and Unilateral Harm with Role-Type Uncertainty; On Avoidance Activities After Accidents; Conclusion
ISBN:	978-3-8349-8127-1 ; 978-3-8349-1292-3
Other identifiers:	10.1007/978-3-8349-8127-1 [DOI]
Classification:	Rechtstheorie, Rechtsmethodik, Allgemeine Rechtslehre ; Strafrecht: Allgemeines
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013521129