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Predation enforcement options : an evaluation using a Cournot framework

Kai Hüschelrath and Jürgen Weigand
The paper characterises the building blocks of a framework to enforce antipredation rules and subsequently evaluates selected enforcement options in a Cournot-type duopoly predation model. Differentiating between a no rule approach, an ex ante approach and two ex post approaches, it is shown that an ex post approach typically maximises overall welfare. However, an ex ante approach can be the preferred option in cases where the entrant has a large cost advantage over the incumbent. -- Competition policy ; monopolisation ; predation ; enforcement
Year of publication:
2010
Authors: Hüschelrath, Kai ; Weigand, Jürgen
Publisher: Mannheim : ZEW, Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung
Subject: Wettbewerbspolitik | Competition policy | Verdrängungswettbewerb | Predatory pricing | Wirkungsanalyse | Impact assessment | Duopol | Duopoly | Wohlfahrtsanalyse | Welfare analysis | Theorie | Theory
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