Preemption, start-up decisions and the firms' capital structure

In this article, we analyse the interactions between financial and start-up decisions in an oligopolistic framework, where firms compete to enter a new market. We show that preemption can substantially reduce the negative effects of credit rationing on start-up investment decisions.

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Year of publication:	2007
Authors:	Moretto, Michele ; Panteghini, Paolo M.
Publisher:	Munich : Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo)
Subject:	Oligopol \| Unternehmensgründung \| Sunk Costs \| Potenzieller Wettbewerb \| Kapitalstruktur \| Realoption \| Theorie

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Series:	CESifo Working Paper ; 2006
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	538291117 [GVK] hdl:10419/26051 [Handle]
Classification:	D92 - Intertemporal Firm Choice and Growth, Investment, or Financing ; G33 - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264136