Preemptive bribery and incomplete information : does prior knowledge matter?
Year of publication: |
June 2017
|
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Authors: | Mishra, Ajit ; Samuel, Andrew |
Published in: |
Journal of public economic theory. - Malden, Mass. : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 1097-3923, ZDB-ID 1468434-2. - Vol. 19.2017, 3, p. 658-673
|
Subject: | Regulierung | Regulation | Korruption | Corruption | Signalling | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Theorie | Theory |
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