Preference profiles sustaining Arrow's theorem

Arrow's theorem is proved on a domain consisting of two types of preference profiles. Those in the first type are "almost unanimous": for every profile some alternative x is such that the preferences of any two individuals merely differ in the ranking of x, which is in one of the first three positions. Profiles of the second type are "appropriately heterogeneous", with preferences similar to those generating the "paradox of voting".

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Year of publication:	2002-03-21
Authors:	Quesada, Antonio
Published in:	Economic Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 20.2002, 3, p. 623-627
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Arrow's theorem \| Domain restriction \| Paradox of voting

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Notes:	Received: March 9, 2000; revised version: June 7, 2001
Classification:	D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005371107