Preference revelation with a limited number of indifference classes

Suppose that g is a strategy-proof social choice rule on the domain of all profiles of complete and transitive binary relations that have exactly m indifference classes. If $m \ge 3$ and the range of g has three or more members, then g is dictatorial. If m = 2, then for any set X of feasible alternatives, there exist non-dictatorial and strategy-proof rules that are sensitive to the preferences of every individual and which have X as range.

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Year of publication:	2002-07-24
Authors:	Campbell, Donald E. ; Kelly, Jerry S.
Published in:	Spanish Economic Review. - Asociación Española de Economía - AEE. - Vol. 4.2002, 2, p. 151-158
Publisher:	Asociación Española de Economía - AEE
Subject:	Dictatorship \| indifference classes \| oligarchy \| strategy-proof

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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