President Perot or Fundamentals of Voting Theory Illustrated with the 1992 Election.

Different voting systems can lead to different election outcomes even when voter preferences are held constant. Using the 1992 election as an example, it is shown how the outcome of every positional vote system can be found. Similarly, every possible cumulative and approval vote outcome is shown. Multiple vote systems, like approval and cumulative voting, have disturbing properties. Using the 1992 election as illustration, it is shown how a candidate who wins under every positional vote system, who wins every pairwise vote (i.e. is the Condorcet winner), and who has the most first place and least last place votes may nevertheless lose under approval or cumulative voting. Similarly, it is shown how a candidate who loses under every positional system, who loses every pairwise vote (i.e. is the Condorcet loser), and who has the least first place and most last place votes may nevertheless win under approval or cumulative voting. Copyright 2001 by Kluwer Academic Publishers