Pricing a package of services: When (not) to bundle

We study a tractable two-dimensional model of price discrimination. Consumers combine a rigid with a more flexible choice, such as choosing the location of a house and its quality or size. We show that the optimal pricing scheme involves no bundling if consumer types are affiliated. Conversely, if consumer types are negatively affiliated over some portion of types then some bundling occurs.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Ketelaar, Felix ; Szalay, Dezsö
Publisher:	München : Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15 - Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (GESY)
Subject:	Price discrimination \| Bundling \| Monopoly \| Multidimensional screening

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Series:	SFB/TR 15 Discussion Paper ; 487
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.5282/ubm/epub.22183 [DOI] 81307441X [GVK] hdl:10419/110400 [Handle]
Classification:	D42 - Monopoly ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010520623