Principal-agent models where a principal is only affected by extreme performances
Year of publication: |
2022
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Authors: | Gerchak, Yigal ; Schmid, Christian |
Published in: |
Managerial and decision economics : MDE ; the international journal of research and progress in management economics. - Chichester [u.a.] : Wiley, ISSN 1099-1468, ZDB-ID 1491342-2. - Vol. 43.2022, 2, p. 468-477
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Subject: | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
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