Principal-Agent Problem with Minimum Performance Insurance

A minimum performance insurance in the Principal-Agent problem is wealth reducing to the principal. This result points to further inefficiencies in mandatory individual Pension Funds' contracts, particularly the one established in the 1993's 100th Law in Colombia.

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Authors:	Julio, Juan Manuel
Institutions:	Banco de la Republica de Colombia
Subject:	Incentives \| Agency Theory \| Pensions

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Borradores de Economia.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; G23 - Pension Funds; Other Private Financial Institutions
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005783877