Private versus verifiable interim performance evaluations under uncertainty

I study the trade-off between private and verifiable interim performance evaluations under uncertainty. More uncertainty leads to higher agency costs if the interim evaluation is public and verifiable but lower agency costs if the interim evaluation is private and unverifiable.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Terstiege, Stefan
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 123.2014, 3, p. 341-344
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Performance evaluation \| Principal–agent \| Moral hazard

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge ; D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory ; M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs)
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010776609