Probabilistic allocation rules and single-dipped preferences
We consider the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible endowment among a group of agents with single-dipped preferences. A probabilistic allocation rule assigns a probability distribution over the set of possible allocations to every preference profile. We discuss characterizations of the classes of Pareto-optimal and strategy-proof probabilistic rules which satisfy in addition replacement-domination or no-envy. Interestingly, these results also apply to problems of allocating finitely many identical indivisible objects – to probabilistic and to deterministic allocation. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2002
Year of publication: |
2002
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Authors: | Ehlers, Lars |
Published in: |
Social Choice and Welfare. - Springer. - Vol. 19.2002, 2, p. 325-348
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Publisher: |
Springer |
Saved in:
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