Procrastination in teams and contract design
Year of publication: |
July 2016
|
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Authors: | Weinschenk, Philipp |
Published in: |
Games and economic behavior. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0899-8256, ZDB-ID 1002944-8. - Vol. 98.2016, p. 264-283
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Subject: | Moral hazard | Team production | Partnerships | Procrastination | Contract design | Discrimination | Deadlines | Arbeitsgruppe | Team | Moral Hazard | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Vertrag | Contract | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Intertemporale Entscheidung | Intertemporal choice |
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