Procurement with costly bidding, optimal shortlisting, and rebates
We consider procurement auctions when bid preparation is costly and shortlisting is adopted. We find that a policy of reimbursing bidding costs is profitable if and only if performance and bidding costs are negatively correlated. Negative rebates dominate positive rebates.
Year of publication: |
2008
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Authors: | Fan, Cuihong ; Wolfstetter, Elmar |
Published in: |
Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 98.2008, 3, p. 327-334
|
Publisher: |
Elsevier |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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