Production Externalities, Congruity of Aggregate Signals, and Optimal Task Assignments

In this paper, we consider the role of production externalities in the task assignment problem. Milgrom and Roberts (1992) suggest that complementarities available when agents are assigned to diverse tasks are necessary to overcome distortions in effort allocations caused by an inability to fine tune incentives when agents' compensation is based on aggregate imperfect signals. Our analysis formalizes this intuition in a setting that encompasses externalities under both diverse and similar task assignments

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Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Hughes, John S. ; Zhang, Li ; Xie, James
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Signalling \| Externer Effekt \| Externalities \| Informationsökonomik \| Economics of information \| Arbeitsproduktivität \| Labour productivity

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (19 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Contemporary Accounting Research, Vol. 22, No. 2, Summer 2005
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; J41 - Contracts: Specific Human Capital, Matching Models, Efficiency Wage Models, and Internal Labor Markets ; M54 - Labor Management (team formation, worker empowerment, job design, tasks and authority, job satisfaction)
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014067099