Properties of the combinatorial clock auction
Year of publication: |
September 2016
|
---|---|
Authors: | Levin, Jonathan ; Skrzypacz, Andrzej |
Published in: |
The American economic review. - Nashville, Tenn. : American Economic Assoc., ISSN 0002-8282, ZDB-ID 203590-X. - Vol. 106.2016, 9, p. 2528-2551
|
Subject: | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Unvollkommener Markt | Incomplete market | Theorie | Theory |
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