Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach.

We consider an economy where property rights are necessary to ensure sufficient rewards to ex ante investments. Because enforcement of property rights influences the ex post distribution of rents there is room for corruption. We characterize the optimal organization of society and the optimal degree of property rights enforcement subject to incentive constraints of the agents.

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Year of publication:	1996
Authors:	Acemoglu, D. ; Verdier, T.
Institutions:	Département et Laboratoire d'Économie Théorique Appliquée (DELTA), École Normale Supérieure (ENS Paris)
Subject:	PROPERTY RIGHTS \| GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM \| ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

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Series:	DELTA Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published in The Economic Journal, 108(450), 1998 29 pages
Classification:	D20 - Production and Organizations. General ; H40 - Publicly Provided Goods. General
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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