Providing CEOs with opportunities to cheat : the effects of complexity-based information asymmetries on financial reporting fraud
Hermann Achidi Ndofor; Curtis Wesley; Richard L. Priem
| Year of publication: |
2015
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Ndofor, Hermann Achidi ; Wesley, Curtis L. ; Priem, Richard L. |
| Published in: |
Journal of management : JOM. - Thousand Oaks, Calif. : Sage Publ., ISSN 0149-2063, ZDB-ID 83220-0. - Vol. 41.2015, 6, p. 1774-1797
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| Subject: | agency theory | compensation | bonuses and benefits | boards of directors | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Führungskräfte | Managers | Betrug | Fraud | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Vorstand | Executive board |
| Extent: | graph. Darst. |
|---|---|
| Type of publication: | Article |
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011339741