Providing Learning Incentives and the Use of a Multi-Purpose Performance Measure

This paper analyses the role of leading indicators that provide a firm manager with learning incentives of firm-specific skills. The effectiveness of leading indicators varies with contract scheme hired between the firm owner and the firm manager. I show that the leading indicator complements the outcome’s role of incentive provision at the sacrifice of information rent caused by the information asymmetry regarding manager’s learning capacity

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Mazda, Yasuhiro
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Performance-Messung \| Performance measurement \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Anreiz \| Incentives \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Theorie \| Theory \| Lernprozess \| Learning process

freely available

Full text |

More access options

doi.org

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

Which error do you want to report?

Report: URL of this record is broken

Please note: Sometimes more than one URL is available for a resource. Please click on "More Options" to display these URLs

Report: Addition of an URL to that resource

Please note: Sometimes more than one URL is available for a resource. Please click on "More Options" to display these URLs

Report: The language(s) of that resource is/are…

Please note: Required language not in the list? Please use comment field

Report: Addition of an identifier to that resource

Report: report typo

Report: Add statement

Report: Add keywords

Please use the commentary box to describe other errors

Would you like to receive a feedback?

Commentary

Please type the code from the image

For general questions please use this address.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014146457