Public debt rule breaking by time-inconsistent voters
Year of publication: |
2021
|
---|---|
Authors: | Arawatari, Ryo ; Ono, Tetsuo |
Published in: |
European journal of political economy. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0176-2680, ZDB-ID 623005-2. - Vol. 69.2021, p. 1-10
|
Subject: | Debt ceilings | Present bias | Public debt | Öffentliche Schulden | Haushaltskonsolidierung | Fiscal consolidation | Theorie | Theory | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Zeitkonsistenz | Time consistency | Schuldenmanagement | Debt management | Regelbindung versus Diskretion | Rules versus discretion | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Intertemporale Entscheidung | Intertemporal choice |
-
Constrained efficient borrowing with sovereign default risk
Hatchondo, Juan Carlos, (2020)
-
Optimal fiscal and monetary policy, debt crisis, and management
Cantore, Cristiano, (2019)
-
Do Fiscal Rules Cause Fiscal Discipline Over the Electoral Cycle?
Eklou, Kodjovi, (2020)
- More ...
-
Public debt rule breaking by time-inconsistent voters
Arawatari, Ryo, (2019)
-
International Coordination of Debt Rules with Time-inconsistent Voters
Arawatari, Ryo, (2020)
-
Public debt rule breaking by time-inconsistent voters
Arawatari, Ryo, (2019)
- More ...