Public randomization in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game with local interaction

We consider a situation in which each agent observes only their neighbor's actions and locally interacts with them by playing prisoner's dilemma games. Introducing a public randomization, we construct an equilibrium which sustains cooperation and in which cooperation eventually resumes after any history.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Cho, Myeonghwan
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 112.2011, 3, p. 280-282
Publisher:	Elsevier
Keywords:	Repeated prisoner's dilemma game Local interaction Public randomization Network

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009249591