Public trust and government betrayal

Christopher Phelan

"This paper presents a simple model of government reputation which captures two characteristics of policy outcomes in less developed countries: governments which betray public trust do so erratically, and, after a betrayal, public trust is regained only gradually"--Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis web site

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Year of publication:	2001
Authors:	Phelan, Christopher
Publisher:	Minneapolis : Federal Reserve Bank, Research Dep.
Subject:	Glaubwürdigkeit \| Credibility \| Reputation \| Wirtschaftspolitik \| Economic policy \| Markov-Kette \| Markov chain \| Theorie \| Theory

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Extent:	21 S
Series:	Staff report / Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. - Minneapolis, Minn., ZDB-ID 1286394-4. - Vol. 283
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper ; Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature
Language:	English
Notes:	Literaturverz. S. 20 - 21
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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