Punishment fosters efficiency in the minimum effort coordination game
Year of publication: |
2012
|
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Authors: | Le Lec, Fabrice ; Matthey, Astrid ; Rydval, Ondérej |
Publisher: |
Jena : Friedrich Schiller University Jena and Max Planck Institute of Economics |
Subject: | Nichtkooperatives Spiel | Arbeitsleistung | Koordination | Strafe | Test | coordination | minimum effort | order-statistic game | punishment | sanction | weakest link |
Series: | Jena Economic Research Papers ; 2012,030 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 720173353 [GVK] hdl:10419/70169 [Handle] |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; D01 - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles ; D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles |
Source: |
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