Pure strategy and no-externalities with multiple agents

This note considers two properties of common agency models - pure strategy equilibria with simple competition are robust and equilibria in mechanisms can be reproduced as equilibria with simple competition provided an appropriate no-externalities assumption holds. This note provides counter examples to both these theorems when there are multiple agents. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2003

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Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Peters, Michael
Published in:	Economic Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 23.2003, 1, p. 183-194
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Common agency \| Multiple agency \| Menus of alternatives

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005147360