Push or pull? : performance-pay, incentives, and information

David Rietzke and Yu Chen

Year of publication:	May 2018
Authors:	Rietzke, David ; Chen, Yu
Publisher:	[Graz] : Department of Economics, Department of Public Economics, University of Graz
Subject:	Pay for Performance \| Moral Hazard \| Adverse Selection \| Observable Action \| Principal-Agent Problem \| Moral hazard \| Adverse Selektion \| Adverse selection \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Leistungsentgelt \| Performance pay \| Anreiz \| Incentives \| Vertragstheorie \| Contract theory \| Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information

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