Push or Pull? Performance-Pay, Incentives, and Information

We study a principal-agent model wherein the agent is better informed of the prospects of the project, and the project requires both observable and unobservable input. We characterize the optimal contracts, and explore the trade-offs between high and low-powered incentive schemes. We discuss the implications for push and pull programs used to encourage R&D activity, but our results are relevant in other contexts

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Year of publication:	2019
Authors:	Rietzke, David
Other Persons:	Chen, Yu (contributor)
Publisher:	[2019]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Leistungsanreiz \| Performance incentive \| Leistungsentgelt \| Performance pay \| Anreiz \| Incentives

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