Quality provision and governance structure variety: Pooling versus double markup

This paper examines how farmers producing differentiated quality products choose different governance structures in a non-cooperative game between farmers, enterprises, and consumers. A cooperative and an IOF (investor owned firm) coexist in equilibrium and low quality is delivered by the cooperative. The trade-off between pooling and the elimination of the double markup determines the attractiveness of cooperatives compared to IOFs.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Liang, Qiao ; Hendrikse, George W. J. ; Huang, Zuhui
Publisher:	Halle (Saale) : Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern Europe (IAMO)
Subject:	Quality \| Cooperatives \| Investor-Owned Firms

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Series:	IAMO Forum 2010, Halle (Saale), June 16 - 18, 2010: Institutions in Transition - Challenges for New Modes of Governance
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Conference Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	676455646 [GVK] hdl:10419/52694 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:iamo10:52694 [RePEc]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure: Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration ; Q13 - Agricultural Markets and Marketing; Cooperatives; Agribusiness
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010307567