Quantal Response Equilibrium with Non-Monotone Probabilities : A Dynamic Approach

In this paper I take a dynamic point of view and give an example of a population game and of a locally improving stochastic learning process such that the quantal response equilibrium assigns to the different strategies the probabilities that are non-monotone in the payoffs. Moreover, if the initial state probabilities are payoff-monotone, then the learning can be shown the shrink mistakes in one direction and exacerbate them in the other direction

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Basov, Suren
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung \| Probability theory \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Lernprozess \| Learning process \| Bevölkerungstheorie \| Population theory

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (15 p)
Series:	Melbourne University Economics Working Paper ; No. 880
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments June 8, 2006 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.907231 [DOI]
Classification:	C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014057685