Quantile stable mechanisms

We introduce a new class of matching mechanisms - quantile stable mechanisms - that generate stable matchings that can be seen as a compromise between sides of a two-sided market. We show that responsiveness is a sufficient condition for the existence of such mechanisms and that all such mechanisms are distinct. We also analyze the manipulability of these mechanisms by market participants.

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Year of publication:	2021
Authors:	Chen, Peter ; Egesdal, Michael ; Pycia, Marek ; Yenmez, M. Bumin
Published in:	Games. - Basel : MDPI, ISSN 2073-4336. - Vol. 12.2021, 2, p. 1-9
Publisher:	Basel : MDPI
Subject:	auctions \| contracts \| incentives \| matching \| mechanisms

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Type of publication:	Article
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Article
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.3390/g12020043 [DOI] 1761271466 [GVK] hdl:10419/257525 [Handle]
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013200105