Quasi-Bargaining Set for Contract Choice Problems

The main result in this paper states that every contract choice problem has a non-empty quasi-bargaining set. The need for such a solution concept which is considerably weaker than the core arises, since it is well known that even for very simple contract choice problems, the core and bargaining sets may be empty

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Year of publication:	2008
Authors:	Lahiri, Somdeb
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Vertragstheorie \| Contract theory \| Matching \| Vertrag \| Contract

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (12 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments January 2, 2008 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1033313 [DOI]
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10014222434