R&D games in a Cournot duopoly with isoelastic demand functions: A comment

In a recent paper, Tramontana (Economic Modelling, 27; 350–357, 2010) investigates the stability properties of a Cournot Duopoly game when the demand function is isoelastic. In this note, we show that for some well known applications of two-stage Cournot games (D. Aspremont and Jacquemin, American Economic Review, 78, 1122–1137, 1988) an isoelastic demand function can guarantee both the existence and the uniqueness of a Nash Equilibrium even in cases where existence is not obtained with linear demands.

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Luckraz, Shravan
Published in:	Economic Modelling. - Elsevier, ISSN 0264-9993. - Vol. 28.2011, 6, p. 2873-2876
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	R&D spillovers \| Isoelastic demand \| Cournot duopoly

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C61 - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis ; C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; D92 - Intertemporal Firm Choice and Growth, Investment, or Financing ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010577136