R&D investment as a signal in corporate takeovers
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects that takeover threats have on firms' preacquisition R&D intensity. Critics of takeovers usually argue that takeover threats may reduce target firms' R&D investments. However, I find that target firms may increase R&D investment in order to signal their compatibility with the acquiring firm. The identity of the acquired firm depends on the market size and target firms' efficiency and compatibility. Through R&D investments, target firms may affect this result, signaling potential outsiders the kind of competition they may face, and forcing them to accept lower takeover offers. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Year of publication: |
2009
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Authors: | Socorro, M. Pilar |
Published in: |
Managerial and Decision Economics. - John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., ISSN 0143-6570. - Vol. 30.2009, 5, p. 335-350
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Publisher: |
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. |
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