Radner's Theorem on Teams and Games with a Continuum of Players

This note considers Bayesian games with a continuum of players, symmetric quadratic payoff functions, and normally distributed signals. It shows that a recent result on the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium is implied by a classical theorem on teams by Radner (1962, Ann. Math. Stat. 33).

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Ui, Takashi ; Yoshizawa, Yasunori
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 33.2013, 1, p. 72-77
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	unique linear equilibrium \| Bayesian potential game \| team

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D8 - Information and Uncertainty
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011278787