Raising rivals' costs with environmental regulation: An intertemporal lobbying approach

This paper addresses the question why a lot of firms demand stricter environmental regulation. With non-identical producers within the same industry, lobbying for tighter environmental rules turns out to be an important strategy of raising rivals' costs. Furthermore, the paper explains when the potential target firms of stricter regulation in such an intra-industrial competition engage in counter-lobbying and when they remain silent.

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Year of publication:	1995
Authors:	Körber, Achim
Institutions:	Fachbereich Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Universität Konstanz
Subject:	Lobbying \| Environmental Regulation

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Papers, Series II.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 263
Classification:	D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; K32 - Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010986291