Random Assignments with Uniform Preferences : An Impossibility Result

We know that a strategyproof mechanism does not exist that is ordinally efficient and fair in the sense of equal division lower bound. We show that this impossibility for random assignments prevails even if agents have uniform preferences where a weakly decreasing utility function determines each agent's preference ranking over the same order of objects

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Year of publication:	2022
Authors:	Ranjbar, Homa Hosseinzadeh ; Feizi, Mehdi
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Präferenztheorie \| Theory of preferences \| Allokation \| Allocation \| Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion \| Social welfare function \| Unmöglichkeitstheorem \| Impossibility theorem

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