Randomization in Coalition Contracts

This article analyzes a much debated clause in the coalition contract between SPD and FDP in Rheinland-Pfalz. Two parties write a contract, based on which decisions under incomplete information have to be made at a later point in time. It is shown that a complex complete contract can achieve the first best outcome. However, a simple incomplete contract can implement the first best outcome only if use of seemingly inefficient randomization is made

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Year of publication:	2007
Authors:	Schmitz, Patrick W.
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Koalition \| Coalition \| Theorie \| Theory \| Regierungskoalition \| Coalition government \| Unvollständiger Vertrag \| Incomplete contract \| Rheinland-Pfalz \| Rhineland-Palatinate
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Public Choice, Vol. 94, Nos. 3-4, 1998 Volltext nicht verfügbar
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

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