Randomization is optimal in the robust principal-agent problem

Ashwin Kambhampati

Year of publication:	2023
Authors:	Kambhampati, Ashwin
Published in:	Journal of economic theory. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0022-0531, ZDB-ID 410539-4. - Vol. 207.2023, p. 1-14
Subject:	Randomization \| Robustness \| Principal-agent models \| Zero-sum games \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Robustes Verfahren \| Robust statistics

Online Resource

Check full text access |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In libraries world-wide (WorldCat)

In German libraries (KVK)

Which error do you want to report?

Report: URL of this record is broken

Please note: Sometimes more than one URL is available for a resource. Please click on "More Options" to display these URLs

Report: Addition of an URL to that resource

Please note: Sometimes more than one URL is available for a resource. Please click on "More Options" to display these URLs

Report: The language(s) of that resource is/are…

Please note: Required language not in the list? Please use comment field

Report: Addition of an identifier to that resource

Report: report typo

Report: Add statement

Report: Add keywords

Please use the commentary box to describe other errors

Would you like to receive a feedback?

Commentary

Please type the code from the image

For general questions please use this address.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013555130

A service of the